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ARTICLES
TERRITORIALITY, RISK PERCEPTION, AND
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE LEGAL STRUCTURES:
THE CASE OF WASTE FACILITY SITING
By
MICHAEL B. GERRARD*
The siting of hazardous and nuclear waste facilities has proven to be a task of
enormous difficulty in our federal system. In this Article, the Author argues
that one of the major causal factors for this difficulty is that the legal regime
surrounding waste facility siting decisions is not structured in a manner
sensitive to the human factors involved. The siting of a hazardous waste fa-
cility is likely to generate a negative community response where the imposi-
tion of externally made decisions and externally generated wastes fails to
take into account the innate human trait of territoriality. Territoriality is a
powerful and instinctive trait embedded in the dynamics of all human com-
munities. When laws attempt to run counter to such a basic aspect of the
human psyche, they are likely to be unable to accomplish their purpose. This
has been the outcome of the current waste facility siting legal regime. The
Author addresses these concerns and ends this Article with a model of com-
prehensive waste facility siting legislation which takes into account the terri-
torial instinct of states and local communities and would therefore be much
more effective in achieving the national goal of providing safe long-term dis-
posal of waste material in a fair and equitable manner.
I. INTRODUCTION
Law is a civilizing influence, but it has limits. When law attempts to
run against a fundamental human instinct or a deep prejudice, immense
conflict is inevitable. This is well known in such areas as the regulation of
* Partner, Arnold & Porter, New York, New York; Adjunct Faculty, Columbia Law
School and Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies; Former Chair, Environmen-
tal Law Section, New York State Bar Association; General Editor, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw PRAC-
TICE GUIDE (1992); Author, WHOSE BACKYARD, WHOSE RISK: FEAR AND FAIRNESS IN Toxic AND
NucLEAR WASTE SITING (1994); J.D. 1978, New York University; B.A. 1972, Columbia
University.
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sexual conduct and racial integration. However, it does not seem to have
been observed how territoriality, an innate human trait, has rendered cer-
tain important structures in environmental law wholly ineffective.
For more than twenty years, Congress has been passing and periodi-
cally fine-tuning laws designed to find sites for the disposal of hazardous
and radioactive waste. Several billion dollars have been spent in this
quest. For all this effort, in the last twenty years only two landfills for
hazardous and radioactive waste have been built on new sites anywhere in
the United States.' Scores of other efforts have floundered. 2
This Article argues that a major reason for this failure is that the cur-
rent system of environmental law unwittingly runs counter to the territo-
rial instinct. This is an instinct that takes several forms, all revolving
around the importance of borders. Outsiders-those on the other side of
the border-should not be sending their trash into your territory, or telling
you what to do. If they try, the natural, deep-seated reaction is to fight
back. Part II describes how students from multiple disciplines have recog-
nized the central place of territoriality in human affairs. Part III explores
the effects of territoriality on the perception of risks. Part IV shows how
aspects of certain environmental laws have ignored these effects in a
counter productive manner. Part V recounts several failed efforts to re-
spect territoriality in waste facility siting. Part VI concludes with a descrip-
tion of a proposal intended to reconcile environmental laws with
territoriality. This proposal is premised on the theory that it is easier to
change statutes than human nature.
II. TERRITORIALITY AND THE URGE FOR SELF-DETERMINATION
Territoriality has been defined as "a behavioral phenomenon associ-
ated with the organization of space into spheres of influence or clearly
demarcated territories which are made distinctive and considered at least
partially exclusive by their occupants or definers."3 Essential to the con-
cept is that territories are defended from encroachment, 4 by violence if
necessary.5
This phenomenon did not begin with human beings. Indeed, the biolo-
gist Edward 0. Wilson has written that "nearly all vertebrates and a large
number of the behaviorally most advanced invertebrates, conduct their
1 These include a hazardous waste landfill in Last Chance, Colorado and a radioactive
waste landfill in Tooele County, Utah. Significantly, both of these facilities were built with
the support, or at least acquiescence, of their local communities. This number does not
include expansions of existing facilities. See MICHAEL B. GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD, WHOSE
RISK: FEAR AND FAIRNESS IN Toxic AND NUCLEAR WASTE SITING 3 (1994).
2 See id. at 3, 50-51.
3 EDWARD SOJA, THE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF SPACE 19 (1971), quoted in DAVID
SEAMON, A GEOGRAPHY OF THE LIFEwoRLD 70-71 (1979).
4 MIRILIA BONNES & GIANFRANco SECCHIAROLI, ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: A PSYCHO-
SOCIAL INTRODUCTION 88 (Claire Montagna trans., Sage Publications 1995) (1992).
5 See William E. Connolly, Tocqueville, Territory, and Violence, in CHALLENGING BOUND-
ARIES: GLOBAL FLOWS, TERRITORIAL IDENTITIES 141 (Michael J. Shapiro & Hayward R. Alker
eds., 1996).
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lives according to precise rules of land tenure, spacing, and dominance.
These rules mediate the struggle for competitive superiority."6
Expanding on this idea, Robert Ardrey has declared that man:
is as much a territorial animal as is a mockingbird singing in the clear Califor-
nia night. We act as we do for reasons of our evolutionary past, not our cultural
present, and our behavior is as much a mark of our species as is the shape of a
human thigh bone or the configuration of nerves in a comer of the human
brain. If we defend the title to our land or the sovereignty of our country, we
do it for reasons no different, no less innate, no less ineradicable, than do
lower animals. The dog barking at you from behind his master's fence acts for
a motive indistinguishable from that of his master when the fence was built.7
Even those scholars who do not believe that territoriality in humans
is an instinct agree on its vital importance. In the words of Robert David
Sack, a geographer at the University of Wisconsin:
Space and time are fundamental components of human experience. They are
not merely naively given facets of geographic reality, but are transformed by,
and affect, people and their relationships to one another. Territoriality, as the
basic geographic expression of influence and power, provides an essential link
between society, space, and time. Territoriality is the backcloth of geographic
contest-it is the device through which people construct and maintain spatial
organizations. For humans, territoriality is not an instinct or drive, but rather a
complex strategy to affect, influence, and control access to people, things, and
relationships. 8
Mary Douglas, a cultural anthropologist who has spent many years
studying risk perception, also writes of the importance of being inside or
outside of a society. She tells us that some primitive cultures blame out-
siders for what we see as natural disasters and that this blaming mecha-
nism enhances internal loyalty.9 Also using techniques from anthropology,
Richard W. Stoffle and his colleagues have defined the "geocultural area"
within which a population considers itself to be at risk from a proposed
hazardous facility.' 0 The importance of territories and boundaries in
human relations is also recognized by sociologists,1 ' geographers, 12 and
architects. 13
Moving to the political sphere, territoriality, nationalism, and separa-
tism are all intertwined. Lea Brilmayer concludes "that every separatist
6 EDWARD 0. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLoGY 256 (1975).
7 ROBERT ARDREY, THE TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE 5 (1966).
8 ROBERT DAVID SACK, HUMAN TERRrrORIALITY ITS THEORY AND HISTORY 216 (1986).
9 MARY DOUGLAS, RISK ACCErABurY ACCORDING TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 59 (Social Re-
search Perspectives: Occasional Reports on Current Topics No. 11, 1985).
10 Richard W. Stoffle et al., Risk Perception Mapping: Using Ethnography to Define the
Locally Affected Population for a Low-Level Radioactive Waste Storage Facility in Michi-
gan, 93 Am. ANTHROPOLOGIST 611-14 (1991).
11 Stanford M. Lyman & Marvin B. Scott, Territoriality: A Neglected Sociological Dimen-
sion, 15 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 236 (1967).
12 See Ladis D. Kristof, The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries, in PoLrcs AND GEO-
GRAPHIC RELATIONSHIPS: TOWARDS A NEW Focus 134-40 (W.A_ Douglas Jackson & Marwyn S.
Samuels eds., 2d ed. 1971).
13 OSCAR NEWMAN, DEFENSIBLE SPACE 51 (1972).
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movement is built upon a claim to territory, usually based on an historical
grievance, and that without a normatively sound claim to territory, self-
determination arguments do not form a plausible basis for secession."1 4
She cites several provisions of the United Nations Charter endorsing the
right to self-determination, 15 and elsewhere she writes of the complex psy-
chology underlying the related phenomenon of nationalism. 16 Dov Ronen
calls the quest for self-determination "a basic human motivation [which]
was written in the American Declaration of Independence and became a
motivating force with eventual universal applicability in the French
Revolution... [a]nd has been spreading since then.' 7 A glance around the
globe at Bosnia, Chechnya, Rwanda, Israel, Ireland, Quebec, and a dozen
other places shows how powerful the urge toward self-determination is
today.
Exactly a century ago, Oliver Wendell Holmes discussed this phenom-
enon in the context of the law of adverse possession:
Sir Henry Maine has made it fashionable to connect the archaic notion of prop-
erty with prescription. But the connection is further back than the first re-
corded history. It is in the nature of man's mind. A thing which you have
enjoyed and used as your own for a long time, whether property or an opinion,
takes root in your being and cannot be torn away without your resenting the
act and trying to defend yourself, however you came by it. The law can ask no
better justification than the deepest instincts of man. 18
Superficial as it is, this quick multidisciplinary survey should make
clear that, whether by nature or by nurture, human beings deeply desire to
determine what happens within their own territory, and to defend against
intrusions from outside their territory. Every individual dwells within sev-
eral concentric circles (such as a home, a town, a state, etc.) and perhaps
several non-concentric circles as well (an ethnic group, an institutional
employer, a profession), but each circle is its own kind of territory.
II. EFFECT OF TERRITORIALITY ON RISK PERCEPTION
Since territoriality is lodged so deeply within the human psyche, it is
not surprising that it affects (among many other things) the perception of
risks. This has frequently been seen in the context of the siting of un-
wanted facilities. Many governments have tried to impose landfills, incin-
erators, and the like on lower units of government. Localities see these
attempts as an invasion of local territory by a hostile outside force. As
such, they are swiftly, and often effectively, repulsed. Efforts to override
local authority usually backfire and increase local opposition, in part be-
14 Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16
YALE J. IN 'L L. 177, 192 (1991).
15 See id. at 181-82.
16 Lea Brilmayer, The Moral Significance of Nationalism, 71 NOTRE DAmE L. REv. 7, 26
(1995).
17 Dov RONEN, THE QUEsr FOR SELF-DETERMINATION 7 (1979).
18 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 477 (1897). I am
indebted to Professor William Buzbee for bringing this passage to my attention.
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cause these efforts increase the local perception of the facility's danger.19
Some studies have shown that people will accept voluntary risks approxi-
mately a thousand times more dangerous than risks they perceive as invol-
untarily imposed.20 An externally-imposed risk is an involuntary one, and
thus much more feared (and fought).
This sense of hostile invasion amplifies the perception of risk in nu-
merous contexts. People are more likely to oppose the siting of a social
service facility (such as a homeless shelter or a group home) in their
neighborhood if it will serve people from outside the community.2 1 If toxic
substances are seen as entering someone's home, they violate the most
sacred territory and evoke an exceptionally strong response.
22
One study actually tested the relationship between territoriality and
reactions to contamination. 23 In the study, a bag of litter was placed in
various locations near residences in the United States and in Greece. The
litter was placed in front yards, on the sidewalks in front of residences,
and on street curbs in front of homes. Observers measured how long it
took the unsuspecting residents to remove the bag. When the litter was
placed in a yard, there was no difference in the speed of removal between
the two countries. However, in the United States, residents removed litter
significantly faster from the sidewalk and street than the residents of
Greek homes. The researchers concluded that because sidewalks and
street curbs are considered semi-public in the United States, but public in
Greece, there was a greater sense of territorial intrusion (and thus a
swifter response) in the United States tests.24
The psychological link between territory and contamination ex-
presses itself in other ways. As the historian Alan M. Kraut has explored at
length, there is an American nativist tradition, dating back to at least the
1830s, of slandering immigrant groups as carriers of particular diseases-
19 See MICHAEL O'HARE ET A.L, FACILITY SITING AND PUBLIC OPPOSITION 57-58 (1983); EMILIE
SCHMEIDLER & PETER M. SANDMAN, GETTING TO MAYBE: DECISIONS ON THE ROAD TO NEGOTIA-
TION IN HAZARDOUS WASTE FACIITY SITING 54 (1988); Daniel Burchard & Robert Hughes, Be-
yond Capacity: Addressing the Concerns of Local Opposition in the Siting Process, 6 STAN.
ENvTL. L.J. 145, 151 (1986-87); see also Richard N.L. Andrews & Terrence K Pierson, Local
Control or State Override: Experiences and Lessons to Date, 14 POL'Y STUD. J. 90, 97 (1985)
(stating that local opposition is sometimes increased as a result of efforts to override local
authority).
20 See DAVID MORELL & CHRISTOPHER MAGORIAN, SITING HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITIES: Lo-
CAL OPPOsrION AND THE MYTH OF PREEMPTION 63 (1982); see also Paul Slovic, Perception of
Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280-81 (1987).
21 See Michael Dear, Understanding and Overcoming the NIMBY Syndrome, 58 J. AM.
PLANNING Ass'N 288, 292 (1992).
22 See MICHAEL R. EDELSTEIN, CONTAMINATED COMMUNITIES: THE SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL IMPACTS OF RESIDENTIAL ToXIc EXPOSURE 64 (1988); Janet M. Fitchen, When Toxic Chemi-
cals Pollute Residential Environments: The Cultural Meanings of Home and
Homeoumership, 48 HUMAN ORGANIZATION 313-14 (1989).
23 Stephen Worchel & Margaret Collis, Reaction to Territorial Contamination as a
Function of Culture, 8 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 370, 372-73 (1982).
24 Id. at 373.
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the Irish with cholera, Italians with polio, Jews with tuberculosis, and
most recently in the 1980s and 1990s, Haitians with AIDS. 25
Noted researchers Paul Slovic and others have used psychometric
techniques involving detailed interviews, focus groups, and polls to mea-
sure the factors that go into the perception of risks from various hazards,
especially proposed facilities. 26 These studies have identified numerous
such factors, and consistently among them are several that relate to terri-
toriality (though not using that term), including the circumstances of the
hazard's origin, whether the hazard is controlled by the respondent or by
an outside force, and whether the hazard is equitably distributed. 27
The point about equitable distribution is especially important. People
react adversely to risks that they see as being unfairly imposed, especially
if the beneficiaries of the activity do not share in the risk.28 Likewise,
there is great resistance to paying the costs of cleaning up someone else's
mess. 29 This sense of unfairness is one of the major motivators of the envi-
ronmental justice movement, many of whose leading voices favor local
control under the banner of "empowerment" which connotes "enabling
those who will have to live with the results of environmental decisions to
be those who actually make the decisions. ,30 It is no coincidence that indi-
viduals with egalitarian viewpoints and anti-hierarchical personalities
have been shown to be especially adverse to technological risks.31
25 See ALAN M. KRAuT, SIENT TRAVELERS: GERMS, GENES, AND THE "IMMIGRANT MENACE"
(1994); see also HOWARD MARKEL, QUARANTINE! EAST EUROPEAN JEWISH IMMIGRANTS AND THE
NEW YORK CITY EPIDEMICS OF 1892 (1997).
26 See Slovic, supra note 20, at 283-84; Paul Slovic, Perceptions of Environmental
Hazards: Psychological Perspectives, in BEHAVIOR AND ENVIRONMENT: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
GEOGRAPHICAL APPROACHES 223 (rommy Garling & Reginald G. Golledge eds., 1993) [herein-
after BEHAVIOR AND ENVIRONMENT]; KENT E. PORTNEY, SITING HAZARDOUS WASTE TREATMENT
FACILITIES: THE NIMBY SYNDROME 126-29 (1991).
27 Slovic, supra note 20, at 283-84; PORTNEY, supra note 26, at 126-29.
28 Roger E. Kasperson & Kirstin Dow, Hazard Perception and Geography, in BEHAVIOR
AND ENVIRONMENTS, supra note 26, at 193, 206, 209-11; see also CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL
ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES 326-28 (1984) (characterizing such risks as
"dread risks" which are associated with an inequitable distribution of risks and benefits).
29 Roger E. Kasperson & Kirstin M. Dow, Development and Geographical Equity in
Global Environmental Change, 15 EVALUATION REV. 149, 155 (1991).
30 Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for
Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L. Q. 619, 661 (1992); see also NICHOLAS
FREUDENBERG, NOT IN OUR BACKYARDS! COMMUNITY ACTION FOR HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT
40 (1984). For a discussion of the role of geography in this context, see John J. Fahsbender,
An Analytical Approach to Defining the Affected Neighborhood in the Environmental Jus-
tice Context, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 120 (1996).
31 Karl Dake, Orienting Dispositions in the Perception of Risk, 22 J. CROss-CuLTURAL
PSYCHOL. 61, 78 (1991); Aaron Wildavsky & Karl Dake, Theories of Risk Perception: Who
Fears What and Why? 119 DAEDALUS 41, 49, 54 (1990); see also Christina G.S. Palmer, Risk
Perception: An Empirical Study of the Relationship Between Worldview and the Risk Con-
struct, 16 RISK ANALYSIS 717 (1996).
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IV. LAW'S COUNTERPRODUCTIVE DISREGARD FOR TERRITORIALITY
In the face of this compelling psychological evidence, much of it not
only backed by solid information but much of it also intuitive, one would
expect the legal system to try to accomplish its objectives with a minimum
of unnecessary intrusion and other anti-territorial tactics. In the realm of
waste facility siting, this would mean seeking disposal sites in communi-
ties that have volunteered for them, not compelling localities to take out-
siders' waste, and seeking alternatives that do not involve siting new
facilities at all.
Unfortunately, this is not what has happened. At least four aspects of
our legal system for siting new facilities collide head-on with our deepest
psychological impulses of territoriality. These four aspects are, the Com-
merce Clause, the use of the preemption doctrine, the framing of the issue
as a locational problem, and the consideration of one waste stream at a
time.
A. Commerce Clause
Hazardous waste is generated everywhere and it is constantly cross-
ing state borders on its way to the cheapest or most suitable disposal spot.
All fifty states export some hazardous waste to out-of-state treatment or
disposal facilities and forty-eight states (all but Alaska and Montana) im-
port hazardous waste.32
Many states are very resentful about the importation of wastes into
their borders.33 However, there is little they can do about it. The United
States Supreme Court has consistently held that waste (whether solid or
hazardous) is an item in interstate commerce and that, under the Com-
merce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the states may not ban or tax either
32 GERRARD, supra note 1, at 104; Review of EPA's Capacity Assurance Program: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Environment, Energy and Natural Resources of the House
Comm. on Government Operations, 101st Cong. 56, 69 (1991) (statement of Doug MacMil-
lan, National Solid Wastes Management Association); see also Interstate Transport of Solid
Waste: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Transportation and Hazardous Materials of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong. 171, 173 (1991) (statement of Doug
MacMillan, National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n).
33 Numerous U.S. examples are set forth in GERRARD, supra note 1, at 103-05 (1994). This
phenomenon also occurs abroad. See Seth Faison, Conspiracy Theories: China's Garbage
War, N.Y. TMEs, June 9, 1996, at E5 (reporting protests in China over allegations that the
United States is importing garbage into that country); Seth Faison, China Convicts Ameri-
can as Trash Smuggler, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 14, 1997, at A3 (reporting persistent protests in
China over allegations that the United States is surreptitiously sending garbage into that
country); see also Alan Cowell, Nuclear Waste Convoy Stirs Angry Protests in Germany,
N.Y. TIEs, Mar. 4, 1997, at A8 (reporting that 30,000 police officers were needed to counter
protests against transport of spent nuclear fuel from point of generation in southwestern
Germany to interim disposal facility in northern Germany); Sheryl WuDunn, North Korea
Agrees to Take Taiwan Atom Waste for Cash, N.Y. TimES, Feb. 7, 1997, at Al (recording
protests by South Korea against North Korea's decision to accept nuclear waste from Tai-
wan for disposal near border).
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its export or its import.34 Several bills have been introduced into Congress
to give states a limited right to regulate the interstate flow of municipal
solid waste, but so far none have been enacted into law.
B. Preemption
The Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitution gives Congress the
power to supersede state laws,3 5 though there are some limits on this au-
thority.36 States have even greater control over municipalities. Local gov-
ernments are not sovereigns and are traditionally seen as creatures of the
states, with as much or as little autonomy as the states care to give them.
3 7
These preemptive powers are broadly exercised in the facility siting
context. The federal government is (in legal theory) the sole decision
maker in the siting of nuclear facilities.38 With respect to hazardous
wastes, the principal federal statute, the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act (RCRA) 39 cedes some authority to the states,40 but this is sig-
nificantly limited.41 At the state level, at least twenty-four states have laws
that specifically override local zoning authority in the siting of hazardous
waste facilities. 42 Predictably, this external control over the placement of
34 C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 'U.S. 383 (1994) (holding that the
town's flow control ordinance, which required all solid waste to be processed at a desig-
nated transfer station before leaving the municipality, violated the Commerce Clause be-
cause it deprives out-of-state competitors of access to the local market); Chemical Waste
Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992) (finding that an additional disposal fee im-
posed on out of state hazardous waste was an impermissible barrier on interstate com-
merce); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 504 U.S.
353 (1992) (holding that a Michigan statute which prohibited private landfill owners from
accepting solid waste that originated outside the county in which the facility is located un-
less authorized by the county's solid waste management plan, violated the provisions of the
Commerce Clause); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (finding outright
bans on the importation of solid or liquid waste are constitutionally impermissible).
35 See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983).
36 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155-59 (1992).
37 See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government
Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6-18 (1990).
38 See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 205-16; Northern States Power Co. v. Minne-
sota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1148 (8th Cir. 1971).
39 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994).
40 Id. § 6929.
41 40 C.F.R. § 271.4(b) (1996); see ENSCO, Inc. v. Dumas, 807 F.2d 743, 744-45 (8th Cir.
1986); Ogden Envtl. Servs. v. City of San Diego, 687 F. Supp. 1436, 1444 (S.D. Cal. 1988).
42 See, e.g., New YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION ON Toxic SUBSTANCES & HAZARDOUS
WASTES, HAZARDOUS WASTE FAciurr SITING: A NATIONAL SURVEY 12 (1987); Oiuo REV. CODE
ANN. § 3734.05 (Banks-Baldwin 1995) (allowing the Ohio hazardous waste facility board to
disregard local zoning powers when selecting sites for hazardous waste dumps); UTAH CODE
ANN § 19-6-207 (1997) (stating that the construction or operation of a hazardous waste treat-
ment, storage, or disposal facility is not required to conform to any local zoning or other
relevant land use regulation).
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a much feared facility in a locality has often aroused tremendous
resentment.4
C. Locational Focus
The federal and state statutes and regulations governing the manage-
ment of hazardous waste focus on where and how the waste should be
disposed. They go into great detail on whether certain material falls within
the hazardous waste regulatory scheme; if it does, it must be handled,
treated, and disposed of in tightly defined ways.
There is very little regulatory attention paid to the creation of the
waste, however. Though the Clean Air Act" and the Clean Water Act 4 5
impose elaborate regulatory control over the generation of air and water
pollution, RCRA and other hazardous waste laws all but ignore this issue
at the front end of the process and focus almost exclusively at the back
end-disposal.46 A great deal of discussion is now taking place concerning
pollution prevention, but in the hazardous waste area, the programs have
almost no regulatory teeth.
If hazardous waste is created, it does indeed have to go somewhere.
ByAimplicitly assuming current levels of hazardous waste creation as a
give.n, RCRA makes inevitable the focus on localities as the final resting
place for this waste. This point has been strongly made by Robert W. Lake
and L. Disch:
By assuming private generation of toxic wastes and public jurisdiction for
waste treatment and disposal, state hazardous waste policy inevitably leads to
the necessity of finding sites for hazardous waste facilities. The basic assump-
tions of hazardous waste regulation define the hazardous waste problem as a
locational problem for the state rather than a production problem for industry.
This transformation enforces the externalization of wastes from the production
process, translates an economic problem for capital into a political problem for
the state, and insulates capital from the negative consequences of
accumulation. 47
The derogatory term "NIMBY" (not in my backyard) is an expression
of this basic assumption that hazardous waste is inevitable, that it must go
somewhere, and that those who resist its importation into their communi-
ties are selfish and irresponsible.A8
43 See Robert W. Lake, Negotiating Local Autonomy, 13 PoLrMCAL GEOGRAPHY 423, 431-
32 (1994); R. Nils Olsen, Jr., The Concentration of Commercial Hazardous Waste Facilities
in the Western New York Community, 39 BUFFALO L. REV. 473, 475-76 (1991).
44 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994).
45 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
46 See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994).
47 R.W. Lake & L Disch, Structural Constraints and Pluralist Contradictions in Haz-
ardous Waste Regulation, 24 ENV'T & PLANNING 663, 671 (1992).
48 See BRUCE A. 'WILLIAMS & ALBERT R. MATHENY, DEMOCRACY, DIALOGUE, AND ENVIRONMEN-
TAL DISPUTES: THE CONTESTED LANGUAGES OF SoCIAL REGULATION 170-73 (1995).
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D. Focus on Individual Waste Types
There are dozens of types of waste streams. Each is regulated sepa-
rately, with its own siting program (or non-program). Among non-radioac-
tive materials, the different waste streams include 1) hazardous waste
regulated under RCRA, 2) remedial waste from cleanup of civilian inactive
hazardous waste sites, such as Superfund sites, 3) remedial waste from
the cleanup of RCRA corrective action sites, 4) wastes from the removal
or upgrading of underground storage tanks, 5) cleanup wastes from old
military facilities, 6) obsolete chemical weapons requiring destruction, 7)
asbestos, lead, PCBs, and other wastes from demolition of buildings and
structures, 8) industrial, special and orphan wastes (often meeting some
of the RCRA hazardous waste characteristics, but legally exempt), 9) min-
ing wastes, 10) oil and gas extraction wastes, 11) sewage sludge 12) resi-
due from air pollution control devices, 13) ash from incinerators, and 14)
medical waste.4 9
The radioactive wastes include 1) high-level waste and transuranic
waste from nuclear weapons production, 2) spent fuel from nuclear reac-
tors, 3) low-level radioactive waste from power plants and from medical,
industrial, and scientific uses, 4) remedial waste from nuclear weapons
production sites, 5) nuclear warheads facing retirement, 6) decommis-
sioned nuclear power plants and nuclear fuel production facilities, 7) ura-
nium mill tailings, 8) naturally-occurring radioactive materials, and 9)
mixed radioactive/hazardous waste.50
With this profusion of different waste types, it is easy for one state to
feel that it handles an unfair share of the nation's RCRA hazardous waste
disposal burden. For instance, if one state happens to have a large RCRA
disposal facility, the state may feel that it is shouldering an unfair propor-
tion of the nation's hazardous waste, while forgetting that other states are
taking its radioactive waste, medical waste, sewage sludge, and all manner
of other waste streams. The compartmentalization of disposal programs
and laws fosters a sense of geographic inequity and leads to state rejection
of offers from communities that have volunteered for certain facilities.
Each state is sensitive to the few kinds of wastes that it takes in, but ig-
nores the many more types of wastes that it exports.
V. FAILED EFFORTS TO RESPECT TERRITORIALITY
In the recent history of waste management in the United States, there
have been several efforts to provide geographic equity and to reduce the
forced importation of waste from one area into another. 51 Most of these
efforts have failed.52
49 GERRARD, supra note 1, at 7-24.
50 Id. at 25-45.
51 Id. at 47-66.
52 Id.
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One such effort was the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986 (SARA). 53 Congress was concerned that most states were
making little progress in siting new hazardous waste disposal facilities and
that "Superfund money should not be spent in States that are taking insuf-
ficient steps to avoid the creation of future Superfund sites."54 In an effort
"to solve the 'NIMBI'... problems that arose because of political pressure
and public opposition,"55 Congress therefore provided that, after October
17, 1989, no state would be eligible for Superfund assistance for remedial
actions at hazardous waste sites unless it provided satisfactory assurances
of "the availability of hazardous waste treatment or disposal facilities
which... have adequate capacity for the destruction, treatment, or secure
disposition of all hazardous wastes that are reasonably expected to be
generated within the State" during the next twenty years.56 These facilities
could be within the state or outside it if there was an interstate agreement
for its use.5 7
Acting under this authority, the United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) required every state to submit a "capacity assurance
plan" detailing the sources, quantities, and characteristics of the hazard-
ous wastes generated within its borders and explaining how those wastes
would be handled.58 Every state submitted a plan and EPA approved al-
most all of them, even where states relied on new facilities that were later
rejected or on facilities in other states that opposed importation.59 There
is no evidence, however, that the capacity assurance requirement has led
to the initiation or approval of any new hazardous waste facilities, 60 and
EPA has all but abandoned the effort.
A second effort came in the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act
of 1980 (LLRWPA). 61 This statute declared that the states, acting alone or
in compacts with other states, were responsible for disposing of their own
low-level radioactive waste (LLRW). The LLRWPA gave South Carolina,
Nevada, and Washington, the only states then with operating LLRW dispo-
53 Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1617 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994)).
54 S. REP. No. 99-11, at 22 (1985); see also 132 CONG. REC. S11563-02 (daily ed. Sept. 17,
1985) (statement of Sen. John H. Chafee (R-R.I.)).
55 Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781, 784 (4th Cir.
1991).
56 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9)(A) (1994).
57 Id. § 9604(c)(9)(B).
58 OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, OSWER DIRECTIVE 9010.00, ASSURANCE OF HAZARDOUS WASTE CAPACITY: GUIDANCE TO
STATE OFFICIALS (1988).
59 Review of EPA's Capacity Assurance Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Environment, Energy and Natural Resources of the House Comm. on Government Opera-
tions, 101st Cong. 281 (1991) (statement of Sylvia K. Lowrance, Director, Office of Solid
Waste, EPA) (noting that the only plans not approved were those from Georgia, Mississippi,
Arizona, Missouri, and District of Columbia); SHARON N. GREEN, PLANNING FOR HAZARDOUS
WASTE CAPACITY: LESSONS FROM THE NORTHEAST STATES 96 (1990).
60 GREEN, supra note 59, at xxiii.
61 Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-
2021d (1994)).
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sal facilities, the power to exclude other states' waste after 1986. By 1985,
little progress had been made in siting new LLRW facilities and Congress
again stepped in with the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amend-
ments Act of 1985.62 This new enactment extended the deadlines, pro-
vided interim milestones, and allowed the three sited states to exclude
waste from states that missed the deadlines.63 It also provided that, in
1993, states that had not made provisions for the disposal of LLRW gener-
ated in their borders would have to "take title" to this waste, thereby as-
suming liability for damage that it causes.6
In 1990, New York State, struggling to site a LLRW facility and acting
under pressure of two counties tentatively designated as the location for a
potential LLRW facility, challenged the constitutionality of the 1985
amendments. In 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the "take title"
provision as a violation of the state's rights under the Tenth Amendment,
but upheld the balance of the statute. 65 The federal requirement that states
site LLRW facilities has sparked enormous controversy all over the coun-
try and, to date, no facility sited under this process is anywhere near li-
censing, much less opening.6
The third effort came in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982
(NWPA), which required the Department of Energy (DOE) to establish a
system of "long term" or "permanent" deep geologic disposal facilities for
both kinds of high-level radioactive waste (HLW)-waste from bomb pro-
duction and spent fuel rods.67 The Act instructed DOE to recommend to
the President three sites to be studied in depth. DOE eventually recom-
mended Yucca Mountain, Nevada, Deaf Smith County, Texas, and Hanford,
Washington.68 In 1986 President Reagan approved these three sites.69
Just as the studies were about to begin, however, Congress stepped
in. In a rider to a budget bill,70 Congress ordered DOE to halt any investi-
gations of the Texas and Washington sites, to bypass the preliminary stud-
ies, and to put the HLW facility at Yucca Mountain.7 1 In response, Nevada
began a long campaign of litigation against the site.72 This campaign has
62 Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842, 1850 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 202lb-2021d
(1994) (repealed)).
63 42 U.S.C. § 2021e (1994).
64 Id. § 202le(d)(2)(C).
65 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 114 (1992) (holding that the Act's monetary and
access incentive provisions are constitutionally permissible but that its "take title" provision
transcends the scope of Congress's enumerated powers and therefore violates the 10th
Amendment).
66 See GERRARD, supra note 1, at 33-35.
67 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10226 (1994); see James H. Davenport, The Law of High-Level Nu-
clear Waste, 53 TENN. L. REV. 481 (1986).
68 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency,
824 F.2d 1258, 1262 (1st Cir. 1987).
69 Nevada v. Herrington, 827 F.2d 1394, 1397 (9th Cir. 1987).
70 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330 (1987).
71 See 42 U.S.C. § 10172(a) (1994).
72 See, e.g., Nevada v. Watkins, 939 F.2d 710, 715 (9th Cir. 1991) (concluding that the
Secretary of Energy's promulgation of guidelines concerning the location of nuclear waste
disposal facilities constituted "preliminary decision making" which is unreviewable under
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not resulted in cancellation of the project, but it has disclosed many tech-
nical problems with the site and has considerably delayed the project. To-
day that opening is not projected for another fifteen to twenty years at the
earliest. The sense of procedural fairness that DOE so wanted to cultivate
has utterly evaporated, and residents call the statute designating Yucca
Mountain the "Screw Nevada Bill." 73
Why did all three of these efforts to achieve geographic equity in
waste facility siting-the hazardous waste, LLRW, and HLW programs-
fail? I believe a primary reason is that each of them dealt with only one
type of waste stream, so that facilities would be needed in only a few
states. This created a scramble for states to be excluded from this select
group. The results of successful siting efforts would inevitably have been
inequitable, with a few losing states and a lot of free riders.
The failure of these and other efforts to site new facilities has led to
the extensive use of on-site treatment and disposal. This is arguably the
most equitable method of all, because the waste ends up where it was
generated. However, the locations may be very poor from an environmen-
tal and public health standpoint.74 Many factories and other waste gener-
ating facilities are located in population centers, near their labor force and
markets,75 thus increasing human exposure to any harmful emissions from
the disposal facility. Many factories were also sited years ago with little
attention paid to whether the site was one which would minimize adverse
environmental impacts.
VI. TOWARD A RECONCILIATION
There is a way to give due regard to the territorial instinct in waste
facility siting while at the same time building needed disposal facilities. It
will now be described.7 6
the APA); Nevada v. Burford, 918 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that Nevada lacked
standing to challenge federal Bureau of Land Management's decision granting the Depart-
ment of Energy a right-of-way to conduct site characterization studies of Yucca Mountain);
Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545, 1552-64 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting Nevada's constitutional
and statutorily based challenges to the federal government's actions concerning the selec-
tion of Yucca Mountain as a nuclear waste disposal site); Nevada v. Herrington, 827 F.2d
1394, 1399 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that states may not use Nuclear Waste Fund Grants to
finance their participation in judicial review proceedings under the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act).
73 The designation of Yucca Mountain for HLW was one of the reasons that Nye County,
where Yucca Mountain is located, has attempted to assert its sovereignty over the vast tracts
of federal lands within its borders. See Alexander H. Southwell, The County Supremacy
Movement: The Federalism Implications of a 1990s States' Rights Battle, 32 GONz. L. REV.
417, 436-37 (1996).
74 See Michael B. Gerrard, Fear and Loathing in the Siting of Hazardous and Radioac-
tive Waste Facilities: A Comprehensive Approach to a Misperceived Crisis, 68 TUL. L. REV.
1046, 1090-91 (1994).
75 Id. at 1091.
76 This proposal is described in considerably greater detail in GERRARD, supra note 1 and
Gerrard, supra note 74.
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The numerous sources and types of hazardous and radioactive wastes
are all regulated separately and are generally disposed of separately in a
multitude of different sorts of facilities, even though the same physical
characteristics, such as geological setting and transportation access, are
desirable for most disposal facilities. There is no coordinated national ef-
fort to site disposal facilities for these varying waste streams.
A national program for allocating waste disposal facilities would have
several advantages. If every state had at least one facility, and the larger
states had the larger facilities, the states would have much less of a sense
of regional unfairness. The larger states might have centralized facilities,
taking a variety of waste streams and subjecting them to several different
kinds of processes. Each kind of waste would be more likely to find its
ideal treatment process. Such a comprehensive approach would also af-
ford considerable economies of scale. Along these lines, several European
nations-Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and the German states of Bavaria
and Hessen-have successfully established centralized hazardous waste
disposal facilities, 77 as have the Canadian provinces of Alberta and
Manitoba.78
For the waste streams included in the centralized process, the next
step would be to prepare a disposal needs assessment. In order to deter-
mine the size and type of facilities needed, the siting process would re-
quire specific information on the nature, quantities, and generation
patterns of waste. EPA would take the lead in assessing non-radioactive
wastes and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would assess radioactive
wastes. This needs assessment would reveal how much new disposal ca-
pacity would be required. Once the capacity needs are known, the process
of allocating the satisfaction of those needs among the states should be
assigned to an independent federal entity, perhaps called the Federal
Waste Disposal Commission (FWDC). The FWDC would have a thankless
task-allocating hated facilities among reluctant states: To avoid unend-
ing, fruitless debate and rampant political interference, I suggest that the
FWDC be a politically independent commission whose recommendations
are subject only to the approval or rejection of the entire package by Con-
gress under the model of the Defense Base Closure Commission (DBCC).
The DBCC has performed admirably in carrying out a similarly unpopular
mission.79
The FWDC would have the job of determining what needed capacity
should be provided by what states. Large centralized facilities would likely
go to the largest exporting states and small transfer stations might go to
importing states. Every state would be allocated at least one facility.
Once all of the needed facilities have been allocated to states, the
FWDC would issue its comprehensive report on where all the facilities
77 Gerrard, supra note 74, at 1192; GERRARD, supra note 1, at 173.
78 BARRY G. RABE, BEYOND NIMBY: HAZARDOUS WASTE SITING IN CANADA AND THE UNITED
STATES 61-106 (1994).
79 See Natalie Hanlon, Military Base Closings: A Study of Government by Commission,
62 U. CoLo. L. REV. 331, 333-40 (1991); GERRARD, supra note 1, at 186.
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would be sited. The report would be submitted to Congress, which would
be required to vote yes or no on the entire package. As with the Defense
Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990,80 the statute establishing the
FWDC would mandate that Congress consider the package as a whole and
not modify the FWDC's recommendations.
After Congress has acted, states should then be able to trade alloca-
tions among themselves. The National Governors Association or a similar
group could establish a trading mechanism. States might also want to
trade disposal rights for waste streams not within the FWDC's jurisdiction,
such as municipal solid waste. If New Jersey, for instance, wanted to ex-
port municipal trash to Indiana, then Indiana might agree so long as it
could send some of its hazardous waste back to New Jersey.
Because every state generates hazardous waste and every state ex-
ports hazardous waste to other states, every state should have some dispo-
sal obligations. No state should think it can get a free ride. States would be
given credit in this allocation process for existing private waste disposal
facilities within their borders inasmuch as such facilities tend to make
these states importers rather than exporters.
Once the state-by-state allocations have been established, each state
should have the responsibility to find the necessary sites for any newly
required facilities. Any site selected for a waste disposal facility would
have to meet minimum technical criteria. Beyond that threshold, however,
the site should be acceptable to the neighboring community. Otherwise,
repeated experience has shown that the community's territorial response
will likely lead to insurmountable opposition. Numerous communities in
the United States have volunteered for hazardous or radioactive waste fa-
cilities. How does one find such communities and secure their consent?
Any effort to describe the communities that are most likely to accept
facilities is perilous and can even involve invidious ethnic stereotyping.
Consequently, it is neither possible nor wise to characterize the communi-
ties that might accept hazardous and radioactive waste facilities. A better
approach to finding volunteer communities is simply to ask.
Herbert Inhaber has described a procedure he calls a "reverse Dutch
auction," which would presumably be carried out through the newspa-
pers.8 ' The auctioneer would propose a compensation amount payable to
a volunteer community. Any county that might be willing to accept the
facility for that amount would bid. For example, the auctioneer might de-
clare a bid of $10 million and keep it open for a month. If no bids were
received, the bid amount would be raised to $20 million the second month,
$30 million the third month, and so on until a bid was received.8 2 A bid
would have to specify a proposed site. Once a bid was received, the auc-
tiort would stop until the site was studied to determine if it was physically
80 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (1994).
81 Herbert Inhaber, Can We Find a Volunteer Nuclear Waste Community?, PUB. UNIT.
FORT., July 15, 1991, at 19; Herbert Inhaber, OfLULUs, NIMBYs and NIMTOOs, PUB. INTER-
EST, Spring 1992, at 52, 61-64 [hereinafter Of LULUs and NIMBYs].
82 This is similar to the auction sometimes conducted by airlines seeking volunteers to
give up their seats on overbooked flights.
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acceptable. During this period, bidding communities would receive funds
from the state to hire their own consultants to do their own studies and
the communities could withdraw their bids at any time. Communities that
did not want the facility under any circumstances would simply not bid.8s
Land on federal facilities would be made available to the extent it was
physically suitable.8 4 In any state that shirked its responsibility, the FWDC
could step in and find sites itself. This resembles the process under the
Clean Air Act in which a federal implementation plan can be prepared for
any state that fails to submit a satisfactory state implementation plan.8 5
Such a role for the FWDC would involve a limited violation of the anti-
preemption principle, but may be necessary in order to induce states to
provide sufficient incentives for volunteer communities to step forward. If
a state failed to meet its FWDC-set allocation of waste disposal, another
sanction could be that other states could initially tax and ultimately ex-
clude its waste from their FWDC-allocated facilities.
Once sites were selected, the states would be responsible for oversee-
ing the detailed characterization studies, permitting, and construction of
the facilities, all under the applicable guidelines of EPA or the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC). 86 Local communities should be given
technical assistance grants to participate in the process. Perhaps each fa-
cility would have its own board of visitors, with federal, state, and local
representation. This board should have full access to the site and its
records and could conduct inspections at will to ensure that all environ-
mental standards are met. It would also regularly meet with facility man-
agement to discuss mutual concerns and could make the discussions
public if its recommendations were not followed. Additionally, the FWDC
might set caps on how much waste each facility could accept, to avoid the
creation of excess capacity that might encourage waste generation.
VII. CONCLUSION
The desire for self-determination, and the urge to seal one's borders
against intrusions by outside people, wastes, or other threats (a bundle of
sentiments that I call territoriality), is a fundamental part of the human
psyche. However, many current legal structures disregard this instinct
and, largely as a consequence, they have failed to achieve their objectives.
A prominent example of this phenomenon occurs in the context of
siting waste disposal facilities. The Commerce Clause, the preemption
doctrine, the focus on waste disposal rather than waste generation, and
the consideration of one waste stream at a time defeat local self-determi-
83 See Herbert Inhaber, A Market-Based Solution to the Problem of Nuclear and Toxic
Waste Disposal, 41 J. An WASTE MGM. Ass'N 808 (1991); Inhaber, supra note 81, at 19-20; Of
LULUs and NIMBYs, supra note 81, at 61-62.
84 Note that such land should be sold or leased to the state or the new facility operator at
the prevailing price for comparable industrial land so as to not create a hidden subsidy.
85 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1) (1994).
86 An exception would be the HLW and transuranic waste repositories, which would
have to be in federal hands because they will contain fissile materials. See GERRARD, supra
note 1, at 27-32.
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nation and combine with a natural aversion to waste facilities to repel the
neighbors of proposed facilities. This repulsion is usually successful in fo-
menting enough opposition to defeat the facility proposal.
To correct this problem, I have proposed a method of national alloca-
tion, state responsibility, and local control. The federal government would
decide what waste disposal facilities are needed and would allocate them
equitably among the fifty states. The states would no longer have the
sense of unfairness and intrusion that comes from seeming to be the na-
tion's (or the region's) dumping ground for a particular kind of waste. Fa-
cilities would ultimately be placed into volunteer communities so most
local residents would also not feel intruded upon.
Facility siting is not the only problem in public policy that is heavily
affected by territoriality, but it is one of the most prominent. The analysis
suggested here could also be applied to other attempts to solve national
problems on the backs of a few localities, such as the siting of prisons,
energy production plants, and other undesirable facilities. Once the role of
territoriality in human reactions to governmental decisions is better un-
derstood, more sound and more effective decisions can be reached.
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